

A NORTON CRITICAL EDITION

Thomas Hobbes

LEVIATHAN



AUTHORITATIVE TEXT

BACKGROUNDS

INTERPRETATIONS

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W • W • NORTON & COMPANY • New York • London

ions in the History of Ideas

on Politics and Ethics translated

and edited by Philip Appelman Third

and Other Writings translated and

translated by Walter Blanco, edited by

Robert Roberts

Richard E. Flathman and David

Ad- and edited by Robert M. Ad-

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ing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the School-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from their either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland or with their will, as in England.

[60]

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pop and of his spiritual subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutual emulation of those Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign Authority, easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is there that do not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unless a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome. That Subjects may be freed from their Allegiance, if by the Court of France, the King be judged an Heretique? That a King (as *Chilperique* of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope *Zachary*), for no cause and his Kingdom given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall? Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory, with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdom, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, displeasing Priests and those not onely amongst Catholics, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.

Chap. XIII.

Of the NATURAL CONDITION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery.

Men by nature Equall.

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret

7. Members of religious orders.

8. Cratuites or payments (usually spelled "vaits").

9. See below, ch. 47.

1. Aspire or claim a right to.

machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Expertence: which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of ones owne wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requirith, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to overawe

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From Equality
proceeds
Diffidence.

From Diffi-
dence Warre.

them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example. So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *Time*, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a shewre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and

3. Damage.

The Incommodities of such a War.

Out of Civil States, there is always Warre of every one against every one.

[62]

publick Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed, and ser-
 fellow Citizens, when he locks his dorses; and of his children, and ser-
 vants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse
 mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse
 mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in
 themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those
 Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be
 made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have
 agreed upon the Person that shall make it.

[63] It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor

condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over
 all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For
 the savage people in many places of *America*, except the government
 of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have
 no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I
 said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there
 would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner
 of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull govern-
 ment, use to degenerate into, in a civil Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men
 were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings,
 and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency,
 are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators;
 having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
 that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their
 Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a
 posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their
 Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies
 the Liberty of particular men.

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
 that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice
 and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power,
 there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in
 warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the
 Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be
 in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and
 Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Sol-
 itude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no
 Propriety; no Dominion, no *Mine* and *Thine* distinct; but only that
 to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.
 And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is
 actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting
 partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire
 of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by

The Passions
 that incline
 men to Peace.

In such a
 Warre, noth-
 ing is Unjust.

4. Perhaps.
 5. Property.
 6. Comfortable or convenient.

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Chap. XIV.

[64]

their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature whercof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapter

Of the first and second NATURAL LAWES, and of CONTRACTS.

Right of Nature what

THE RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call *Jus Naturale* is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Liberty what

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external Impediments: which Impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his Judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

A Law of Nature what

A LAW OF NATURE, (*Lex Naturalis*) is a Precept, or general Rule found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound *Jus*, as *Lex*, *Right* and *Law*; yet they ought to be distinguished; because *Right* consisteth in Liberty to do, or to forbear; Whereas *Law*, determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that *Law*, and *Right*, differ as much as *Obligation*, and *Liberty*; which in one and the same matter a inconsistent.

Difference of Right and Law

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and the is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, preserving his life against his enemies: It followeth, that in such condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one another body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong thing endureth, as long as this natural Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general Rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as far as he hath hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seeke Peace, and follow it. The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can, to defend our selves.

Naturally every man has Right to everything

The Fundamentals of Law of Nature

From this Fundamentals Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defer

The second Law of Nature. [65]